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Abstract 
We explored the possibility that the encoding flexibility processes postulated by 
Sherman and colleagues (1998) may also apply to intentional impression formation 
settings, even when cognitive resources are available to conceptually encode all of the 
behavioral information regardless of the relation of that information to the initial 
stereotypical expectancies. Three experiments offer evidence for the lower conceptual 
fluency for expectancy-incongruent behaviors, compared with congruent behaviors, 
as well as for the consequences of that difference for impression formation. 
Experiment 1 shows that incongruent behaviors are perceived as more difficult to 
understand in meaning. Experiment 2 links this lower conceptual fluency with a better 
discrimination of the specific trait implications of the behaviors. We further explore 
the role of conceptual encoding difficulty for developing personality impressions 
(Experiment 3). These studies reveal the implications of initial expectancies for the 
differential conceptual encoding of congruent and incongruent behaviors, even when 
the availability of cognitive resources is high, such as when forming an intentional 
impression about a person’s personality. The link between this process and encoding 
the trait implications of behaviors may shed new light on impression formation 
processes and demand a revision of some of the assumptions that were made by the 
classical person memory model. We contend that behavior encoding in impression 
formation is likely to begin with default trait encoding but will be inhibited when the 
implications of the behavior conflict with previous trait expectancies (see also 
Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2003).  
Keywords: encoding flexibility; impression formation; trait inferences; 
expectancies 
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Introduction 
It is difficult not to wonder how important trait and person-descriptive words 
are to Westerners. According to the Sapir-Wholf hypothesis (now partially 
discredited), the Inuit people had more than 20 words for snow because snow was 
crucial to their lives. For trait words, this number appears to be even larger. Anderson 
(1966) published likableness ratings for 555 trait words and Dumas, Johnson and 
Linch (2002) recently published an even more exhaustive list that tested 844 person 
descriptive words. Personality traits were also important in early attempts to study 
person cognition and lists of traits were used to induce impression formation (e.g., 
Anderson, 1966; Asch, 1946), examine associations between personality attributes 
(Bruner, Shapiro & Tagiuri, 1958), and better understand the underlying semantic 
structure of impressions (by requiring participants to group large numbers of traits 
according to whether they described the same person; Rosenberg, Nelson & 
Vivekananthan, 1968). Soon after, researchers tried to pinpoint the differences 
between forming an impression of a target’s personality and simply memorizing the 
trait-implying information. Traits were proposed to be encoding organizers 
(Hamilton, Katz & Leirer, 1980) or the basis for efficient retrieval strategies (Klein & 
Loftus, 1990) when the perceiver’s goal was to form an impression but not when the 
goal was to memorize the same information. 
Thus, traits appear to be trading tools for forming impressions of others, 
specifically when the social perceiver is presented with trait-implying information 
from a target, as it is the case in most impression formation studies. However, are 
traits always uniformly inferred when trait-implying information is available, or do 
previous expectancies moderate the likelihood of the occurrence of trait inferences? 
More importantly, what are the consequences of possible trait-encoding difficulties 
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during impression formation? In this paper, we first discuss a model that is relevant to 
these questions, the encoding flexibility model (Allen, Sherman, Conrey, & 
Stroessner, 2009; Sherman & Frost, 2000; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff & Frost, 1998), 
which explicitly addresses the role of expectancies on the differential encoding 
processes of expectancy-inconsistent and consistent information. Then, we propose an 
extension of the encoding flexibility model to include impression formation and test 
several theoretical predictions in three experiments.  
The encoding flexibility model 
Expectancy-inconsistent information is sometimes privileged in information 
search and memory (e.g., Graesser, Gordon & Sawyer, 1979; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; 
Srull, 1981). Other times, expectancy-consistent information appears to have the 
cognitive upper hand (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988; Cohen, 1981; Crawford & 
Skowronski, 1998; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Snyder & Swan, 1978; for a meta-
analysis, see Fyock & Stangor, 1994). There have been several attempts to identify 
the exact conditions under which each type of information (expectancy-inconsistent 
versus consistent) prevails over the other (e.g., Bardach & Park, 1996; Fyock & 
Stangor, 1994; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Wänke & Wyer, 
1996). However, few studies have provided supportive evidence (but see Garcia-
Marques & Hamilton, 1996; Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, & Maddox, 2002). Recently, 
the encoding flexibility model provided one interesting account for the problem.  
The encoding flexibility model builds on the distinction between conceptual 
and data-driven encoding processes (cf. Johnston & Hawley, 1994). Conceptual 
encoding processes are top-down, meaning-based processes that are targeted at 
extracting the common gist of episodes or categories. In contrast, data-driven 
encoding processes are bottom-up processes that encode each episode’s specific 
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features. According to the model, expectancies are particularly useful because they 
allow for both preserving and effectively allocating cognitive resources. Thus, while 
expectancy-inconsistent information benefits from extensive data-driven encoding, 
expectancy-consistent information is encoded in a gist-based manner. The model 
posits that this role for expectancies is most evident when cognitive resources are 
scarce. Under these conditions, the asymmetries between expectancy-congruent and 
incongruent information, for conceptual versus data-driven encoding processes, are 
considerably accentuated (see Sherman, Conrey, & Groom, 2004; Sherman et al., 
1998).  
We argue that under impression formation processing goals, conceptual or 
gist-based sentence encoding corresponds to trait encoding, while data-driven 
encoding corresponds to encoding specific features of the sentence and its context (for 
a similar proposal see Almeida, 2007). Because trait encoding of trait-implying 
information is likely to occur by default in impression formation settings, facilitating 
the trait encoding of expectancy-congruent behaviors may be difficult to detect. Thus, 
we focus on expectancies’ impairment effects on the trait encoding of incongruent 
behaviors, as well as on the consequences of these impairments.  
Potential consequences of trait encoding difficulties during impression formation 
Even if activating initial expectancies makes the trait encoding of expectancy-
incongruent behaviors more difficult, the consequences of this impairment for 
impression formation are still not clear. 
As discussed above, our main goal is to extend the encoding flexibility model 
to impression formation contexts. If expectancies that are incongruent with trait-
implying behaviors make the trait encoding of these behaviors difficult, then failure in 
extracting the gist (i.e., traits) of the behaviors should make them difficult to 
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understand and less informative. Experiment 1 tests this prediction and uses an 
impression formation paradigm. Experiment 2 specifically tests for the differential 
impact of expectancies (congruent or incongruent with trait-implying behaviors) on 
trait encoding. We expect to find obstructions in the trait encoding of expectancy-
incongruent behaviors. Finally, to better grasp the role of trait encoding inhibition in 
the impression formation process, Experiment 3 directly manipulates difficulties in 
trait encoding for either expectancy-congruent or incongruent behaviors. Given that 
difficulties in conceptual (trait) encoding may result in better performance on free 
recall tasks, we tested the impact of our manipulation on the differential recall of 
expectancy-congruent and incongruent information. 
Experiment 1 
If expectancies that are incongruent with trait-implying behaviors hamper the 
trait encoding of these behaviors, then expectancy-incongruent behaviors should be, 
compared with congruent behaviors, more difficult to understand and, therefore, less 
informative about the target’s personality. To test this, we asked participants to assess 
the ambiguity of a set of behaviors that were related to the target’s personality. We 
expected that incongruent behaviors would be rated as more ambiguous than 
congruent behaviors. 
To ensure that performing the ambiguity ratings did not interfere with the 
usual processing of the behaviors, we included a free recall measure that is influenced 
by the differential processing of expectancy-congruent and incongruent behaviors. 
Specifically, we expect a recall advantage for expectancy-incongruent behaviors over 
expectancy congruent behaviors (i.e., the incongruency effect) under impression 
formation but not memorization processing goals (Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 
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1996; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Sherman & Hamilton, 1994; Srull, 1981; Srull, 
Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985). 
In sum, the study hypotheses are that: ambiguity ratings should be higher for 
expectancy-incongruent than congruent behaviors (Hypothesis 1) and recall levels 
should be higher for expectancy-incongruent than expectancy congruent behaviors 
(i.e., the incongruency effect) (Hypothesis 2). 
Method 
Overview. The general procedure was consistent with Garcia-Marques and 
Hamilton’s (1996) paradigm. Participants formed an impression of an individual 
target about whom an initial expectancy was activated and then read 36 behavioral 
descriptions one at a time: 12 expectancy-congruent, 12 incongruent and 12 
irrelevant. Additionally, half of the participants evaluated the degree of ambiguity for 
some behaviors, whereas the other half did not perform an evaluation (the control 
condition). Ambiguity ratings were requested for six behaviors – three expectancy-
congruent and three incongruent. After reading the behaviors and finishing the 
requested evaluations, participants completed a filler task and were then asked to 
freely recall the presented behavioral descriptions. 
Participants. Participants were 112 undergraduate psychology students from 
the University of Lisbon and ISCTE–IUL, who earned one credit for an introductory 
psychology course for participating in this study. 
Stimulus Materials and Constructing the Stimulus Set. The initial target 
expectancy was activated by reference to the occupational group and three 
stereotypical traits. The two target pairs generated opposite expectancies (child-care 
professional is stereotypically friendly, whereas a traffic policeman is unfriendly; 
mathematician is stereotypically intelligent, whereas a bouncer is unintelligent).  
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The lists of behaviors presented to the participants (see Garrido, 2001; 
Jerónimo, 2001) varied in trait-dimension replication (friendly-unfriendly and 
intelligent-unintelligent) by list version and rating position. First, occupational group 
ascriptions were counterbalanced across behavior sets, which made each behavior 
expectancy-congruent in half of the conditions and expectancy-incongruent in the 
other half of the conditions. Thus, it was possible to compare ambiguity ratings and 
free recall levels for the same behavioral descriptions when they were congruent and 
incongruent with prior expectancies. 
Second, we created two versions of these lists, such that the behaviors 
evaluated for ambiguity in one version were not evaluated in the other version and 
vice-versa.  
Third, ambiguity ratings were made on the first or second half of the behavior 
list. In this procedure, we attempted to minimize interference from the rating task on 
the impression formation process. A second version of the behavior lists was created 
in which we did not request ambiguity ratings. 
Design. The design was a 2 (Ambiguity ratings: absent vs. present) x 4 (Type 
of expectancy: friendly vs. unfriendly vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) x 2 (Behavior 
list: version A vs. version B) x 2 (Rating position: first half vs. second half) x 3 
(Behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent vs. irrelevant), with the last factor varying 
within participants. 
Procedure. We individually tested participants on an IBM-compatible PC. 
The study was presented as, “the way in which we form an impression of a person on 
the basis of that person’s actions.” Instructions to the participants for the “rating” 
condition also included information for evaluating the ambiguity of some of the 
target’s behaviors on an eleven-point scale (from non-ambiguous at all to extremely 
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ambiguous). For participants in the rating positions’ “first half,” evaluations were 
only made until a certain point in the behavior presentation that was signaled by “last 
scale.” Participants in the “second half” position were informed that the evaluations 
would only be made after a certain point in the behavior presentation.  
Initial information that was provided about the target comprised the 
occupational group and three personality traits that were stereotypic of that group, 
after which the computer automatically presented behaviors, one at a time, at a rate of 
8 sec per item. For critical behaviors, after the behavior had been presented, the 
ambiguity scale appeared on the screen for 8 sec or until an answer was detected, after 
which another behavior was presented. Then, participants performed a pseudo-word 
letter-matrix (5-minute filler task) and tried to recall as many of the presented 
behaviors as possible (10-minute free recall task). Finally, we debriefed participants 
and they were thanked for their participation. 
Dependent Measures. The dependent measures in this study were the 
ambiguity ratings for expectancy-congruent and incongruent behaviors and the 
number of recalled expectancy-congruent, incongruent, and irrelevant behaviors. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. Before analyzing the differences for the mean 
ambiguity ratings, we evaluated the ratings internal consistencies. The ambiguity 
ratings for expectancy-congruent behaviors had a .70 Cronbach alpha coefficient and 
the correlations among ratings were reliable (> .49). A principal components factor 
analysis revealed a single factor that explained 62.5% of the total variance, with all 
behaviors strongly associated with the factor (> .77). The internal consistency of the 
ambiguity ratings for the expectancy-incongruent behaviors was lower and had an 
alpha coefficient of .44, which was because the first incongruent behavior was weakly 
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correlated (.20) with the remaining incongruent behavior evaluations. The ambiguity 
ratings for the other two incongruent behaviors were significantly correlated (r = .30, 
p < .05). Given that the ambiguity ratings’ internal consistencies for the expectancy-
incongruent behaviors were impaired for the first presented behaviors, all subsequent 
analyses excluded that behavior. The same pattern of results was found when all 
behaviors were analyzed, thus, we examined the entire set of evaluations for the 
ambiguity scale. 
Ambiguity Ratings. The dependent variable was the mean ambiguity rating 
in a 4 (type of expectancy) x 2 (behavior list) x 2 (rating position) x 2 (behavior type: 
congruent vs. incongruent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on 
the last variable. A main effect for behavior type was the only effect that emerged 
from this analysis, F(1, 48) = 14.13, p < .001, MSE = 6.23, p

=.23, and showed that 
the ambiguity ratings were higher for expectancy-incongruent (M = 6.49, SD = .26) 
than congruent behaviors (M = 4.83, SD = .33), thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Free Recall. The behavioral descriptions that were recalled by each 
participant were categorized by two coders who were blind to the experimental 
conditions and used a lenient (“gist”) criterion. There was high reliability for the 
coding procedure, with inter-coder agreement greater than 95%. Intrusions (less than 
4%) and errors that inverted the behavior’s meaning were omitted from the analyses. 
Recall performance was analyzed in a 2 (rating request) x 4 (type of 
expectancy) x 2 (behavior list) x 3 (behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent vs. 
irrelevant) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last factor. 
The “rating position” variable was not included in the present analysis because it was 
not manipulated in the no-rating condition. However, supplementary analyses showed 
that it was not statistically significant and did not interact with other factors.  
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There was a main effect for behavior type as predicted by Hypothesis 2, F(2, 
188) = 7.18, p < .001, MSE = 1.89, p

=.07. Planned contrast analyses revealed that 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors were better recalled (M = 4.90, SD = .18) than 
congruent behaviors (M = 4.50, SD = .17; t(94) = 2.31, p =.029, one-tailed), and both 
were better recalled than irrelevant behaviors (M = 4.19, SD = .17; t(94) = 2.93, p = 
.006, one-tailed)
1
. 
There was also a main effect for rating requests, F(1, 94) = 18.96, p < .001, 
MSE = 6.03, p

=.17, which reflected higher recall levels in the “no-rating” condition 
(M = 5.12, SD = .20) than in the “rating” condition (M = 3.93, SD = .18). There was a 
significant interaction effect between the behavior type and the rating request, F(2, 
188) = 4.58, p < .05, MSE = 1.89, p

=.05 (see Table 1); however, the difference 
between recall levels for expectancy-incongruent and congruent behaviors were the 
same in the rating and no-rating conditions (F < 1), which suggests an incongruency 
effect in both conditions. Thus, only the difference between recall for the relevant 
(congruent and incongruent) and irrelevant behaviors is affected when a rating is 
requested (M = 4.26, SD = .23 and M = 3.27, SD = .23, for relevant and irrelevant 
behaviors) compared with the no-rating condition (M = 5.13, SD = .26 and M = 5.10, 
SD = .26, for relevant and irrelevant behaviors; F(1, 94) = 7.89, p = .001).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                 
1
 The effect of the behavior type was qualified by the type of expectancy, F(6, 188) = 
5.36, p < .0001, MSE = 1.89. This effect results from the absence of differences in 
recalling relevant (M = 4.47, SD = .35) and irrelevant (M = 4.93, SD = .35) behaviors 
for intelligent expectancy and from the absence of differences in recalling congruent 
and incongruent behaviors for unfriendly expectancies (M = 5.27, SD = .33 vs. M = 
4.91, SD = .36). This reveals a non-interpretable effect for the experimental materials. 
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The free recall analysis supports the incongruency effect. This effect was not 
affected by the presence of a rating request (only the difference between the recall 
levels for relevant and irrelevant behaviors was affected) or by the ratings’ position. 
Discussion 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants made higher ambiguity ratings for 
expectancy-incongruent compared with congruent behaviors. This suggests that 
incongruent behaviors are more ambiguous about the target’s personality than the 
congruent behaviors. This result is impressive because the same behaviors were used 
for the expectancy-incongruent and congruent items (expectancy status changed as a 
function of the expectancy manipulation).   
In addition, since expectancy-incongruent behaviors were better recalled than 
congruent behaviors in the present experiment (supporting Hypothesis 2 and 
replicating the incongruency effect), performing the ratings did not interfere with 
normal information processing. Therefore, we believe that the observed differences in 
the perceived ambiguity of expectancy-congruent and incongruent behaviors resulted 
from normal processes that underlie impression formation. 
These differences in difficulty for extracting expectancy-congruent and 
incongruent behaviors’ meanings corroborates the role of prior expectancies in 
obstructing incongruent behaviors’ conceptual encoding, even when cognitive 
resources are available. Experiment 2 further explores these differences consequences 
for extracting meaning.  
Experiment 2 
This experiment explores the memory consequences for the differences in 
expectancy-congruent and incongruent behavior’s conceptual encoding that were 
obtained in Experiment 1.  
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Previous research on trait inferences suggests that gist-based encoding for a 
trait-implying behavior often corresponds to encoding the implied trait, while data-
driven encoding for the same behavior corresponds to an episodic type of encoding 
(see Almeida, 2007). Thus, the trait encoding difficulties that were triggered by 
expectancy information that was incongruent with the trait-implying behaviors that 
were shown in Experiment 1 should also be found when we compare participants’ 
memory for the expectancy-congruent and incongruent behavioral descriptions.   
This difference in the trait encoding probability may have source monitoring 
consequences. Specifically, if the higher conceptual fluency of expectancy-congruent 
behaviors that was shown in Experiment 1 facilitates personality trait encoding 
(conceptual encoding), then subsequent attempts to determine if that trait was 
presented with the behavior or inferred will be very difficult. In contrast, given the 
difficulty in the trait-encoding of incongruent behaviors and reliance on a context-
specific type of encoding, it should be easier to later discriminate between trait 
activation that results from conceptual encoding and trait activation that results from 
the trait’s presence in the behavioral description. According to the source-monitoring 
framework, discriminating an internally generated memory trace (e.g., an inferred 
trait) from an externally generated memory trace (e.g., an explicitly presented trait) is 
less reliable for memory traces of easily generated mental events. This is because the 
latter includes little details that are related to its internal generation process, which 
makes them more similar to traces from externally generated events (see Johnson, 
Hastroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009).  
To take advantage of these source monitoring difficulty differences, half of 
the expectancy-relevant behaviors that were used in this experiment were changed to 
include the implied trait, while the other half of those behaviors were presented with 
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no trait included. For example, the behavioral description, “He won a chess 
tournament with more than fifty participants,” was changed to, “He was so brilliant 
that he won a chess tournament with more than fifty participants.” In a memory test, 
we asked participants to perform a forced recognition task in which they identified 
whether a behavior was initially presented with or without the implied trait that was 
explicitly stated in the sentence. In that task, participants were presented with two 
versions of the same behavioral description that only differed in the presence or 
absence of the implied trait and indicated which version matched the trait that was 
presented earlier.  
According to our proposal, distinguishing cases in which the trait was encoded 
from the behavior from cases in which the trait word was included in the behavior 
description should create a more difficult source monitoring problem for expectancy-
congruent behaviors. In contrast, source identification problems should decrease for 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors because conceptual or trait encoding is less likely 
to occur. 
Recognition accuracy in the forced recognition task was measured by the 
discriminability (d’) between the behaviors that were presented with and without a 
trait and the proportion of false alarms for behaviors presented without a trait. 
Because trait encoding would be less likely for incongruent than congruent behavior 
descriptions, discrimination should be easier for incongruent compared with 
congruent behavior descriptions. This difference in discrimination is predicted to be 
due to a propensity to commit false alarms for congruent relative to incongruent 
behaviors (i.e., choosing the version of a behavior that includes the implied trait when 
it was presented without the trait). This propensity would suggest that the trait was 
actively inferred as part of conceptual encoding.  
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We also added a no-expectancy condition, which allowed us to better 
understand if the differences in trait-encoding for expectancy-congruent and 
incongruent behaviors specifically depend on the expectancy’s activation. When 
comparing the recognition accuracy for the same behavioral examples that were 
presented under the no-expectancy and expectancy conditions, we predicted higher 
discriminability and lower false-alarms for the expectancy-incongruent behaviors 
compared with the no-expectancy behaviors. In other words, we expected that 
expectancy’s activation would be responsible for more difficulty in the trait encoding 
for incongruent behaviors. In contrast, we did not expect a difference between the 
expectancy-congruent behaviors and the same behavioral descriptions in the no-
expectancy condition. In fact, because the behaviors selected for this study were good 
exemplars of a given personality trait and easy to interpret and because there is ample 
evidence that trait inferences are spontaneously made from behaviors (Uleman, 
Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), this process should occur by default. As such, an 
expectancy cannot increase the activation of a concept that is already activated by the 
(congruent) behavior.      
In sum, the hypotheses are that: expectancy-incongruent trait-implying 
behaviors that are presented with or without the implied trait will be easier to 
discriminate than expectancy congruent behaviors in a recognition task (Hypothesis 
1); false alarms will be less frequent for expectancy-incongruent than congruent 
behaviors that are presented without a trait (Hypothesis 2). The same behavioral 
descriptions will be easier to discriminate in the expectancy-incongruent than the no-
expectancy conditions (Hypothesis 3); and false alarms will be less frequent for 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors that are presented without a trait than the same 
behavioral descriptions in the no-expectancy condition (Hypothesis 4).  
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Method 
Overview. This study’s characteristics were similar to the no-rating condition 
in Experiment 1. As in that experiment, we asked participants to form an impression 
about one individual target on the basis of a set of behavioral descriptions. However, 
there were two important changes. First, an initial expectancy about the target was 
activated for only half of the participants. Second, from the behaviors that were 
presented, half of the expectancy-relevant behaviors, or their descriptive counterpart 
in the no-expectancy condition, included the implied trait in the behavior description.  
Then, participants completed a forced recognition task in which two versions 
of the same behavior (with and without the implied trait) were presented and 
participants selected the version that matched the one that was presented during the 
impression formation phase.  
Participants. Participants were 48 undergraduate psychology students from 
ISCTE–IUL, who earned one credit for an introductory methodology course for their 
participation in this study. 
Stimulus Materials and Constructing the Stimulus Set. The initial 
expectancy about the target was activated by referencing an occupational group 
(either a child-care professional or skinhead for the friendly-unfriendly expectancies, 
and a computer programmer or construction worker for the intelligent-unintelligent 
expectancies) and four personality traits that were stereotypical of that group.  
Thirty-six behaviors were presented to every participant: 12 expectancy-
congruent; 12 incongruent; and 12 irrelevant. There were 4 different behavior sets that 
varied in trait-dimension replication (friendly-unfriendly and intelligent-unintelligent) 
and stimulus set version. Similar to Experiment 1, the occupational group ascription 
was counterbalanced across behavior sets. Because only half of the expectancy-
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relevant behaviors (or their descriptive counterparts in the no-expectancy condition) 
were presented with an explicitly stated implied trait, we created two complementary 
versions of the behavior set. The behavior descriptions, with and without the trait, for 
the same behavioral descriptions were identical and only differed by 
including/excluding the trait in the behavioral description. The personality traits that 
were included in behavior description were selected from words that were generated 
in a small pre-test study (n = 16), in which participants generated up to three trait-
words for each set of behavior descriptions. 
The recognition lists were composed of pairs of both versions of each 
behavior (with and without the trait). Because neutral behaviors were always 
presented without a trait, a new version of these behaviors had to be created for the 
recognition test and included a personality trait (e.g., the trait “lucky” in the behavior, 
“He was so lucky that he parked the car near his place”). However, that personality 
trait was never related to the relevant trait dimensions. 
Design. The design was a 2 (Expectancy: present vs. absent) X 4 (Type of 
expectancy: friendly vs. unfriendly vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) x 2 (Behavior list: 
version A vs. version B) x 3 (Behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent vs. irrelevant), 
with the last factor varying within participants and the type of expectancy replication 
factor nested in the present level of the expectancy factor. 
Procedure. We tested participants using IBM-compatible PCs. All 
instructions, stimuli, and tasks were presented with E-Prime version 1.1.4.6 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The initial instructions informed 
participants that they were participating in an impression formation study. The 
expectancy condition instructions included a brief description of the target, which 
included the target occupational group and four personality traits that were stereotypic 
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of that group. The instructions for the no-expectancy conditions only referred to the 
name of the target. Then, participants read on the computer screen, at a rate of one per 
6 sec, the 36 behaviors that corresponded to their experimental condition; half of the 
expectancy-relevant behaviors (or their descriptive counterparts in the no-expectancy 
condition) were presented with the trait included in the description, while no trait was 
included in the other half; neutral behaviors were presented without including a trait.  
After performing a 10-min filler task that consisted of a pseudo-word letter 
matrix, participants completed the forced recognition task. For each behavior, the two 
possible versions (with and without the trait included) were simultaneously presented 
on the center of the screen, one above the other, for a maximum of 15 sec. 
Participants’ task was to select, as accurately as possible, the version of the behavior 
that matched the behavior that was presented earlier by pressing the appropriate key 
on the keyboard. When no answer was detected in the available time, the next pair 
would automatically be displayed. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation.  
Dependent Measures. The dependent measures in this study were recognition 
discriminability (d’) for congruent and incongruent behaviors and the proportion of 
false alarms for recognizing congruent and incongruent behaviors that were presented 
without a trait. 
Results 
We were most interested in the impact of prior expectancies on recognition 
accuracy for congruent and incongruent behaviors. As such, our first analysis only 
examined the conditions that induced a prior expectancy. The d’ for expectancy-
congruent and incongruent behaviors was the dependent measure in a 4 (type of 
expectancy) X 2 (behavior list) X 2 (behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent) 
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ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last variable. The only statistically 
significant effect was the main effect for behavior type, F(1, 16) = 5.63, p < .05, MSE 
=1.28, p

= .26, which revealed, as predicted, higher recognition discriminability for 
incongruent (M = 2.42, SD = .30) compared with congruent (M = 1.64, SD = .23) 
behaviors. In a second analysis, the proportion of false alarms for congruent and 
incongruent behaviors that were presented without a trait was the dependent measure 
in a 4 (type of expectancy) X 2 (behavior list) X 2 (behavior type: congruent vs. 
incongruent) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last variable. As predicted, 
there was a significant main effect for behavior type, F(1, 16) = 6.95, p < .05, MSE = 
.02, p

=.30, which showed less false alarms for incongruent (M = .09, SD = .03) 
than congruent (M = .19, SD = .03) behaviors
2
.  
Taken together, the results from these two analyses revealed that trait 
encoding of the behaviors was less likely for expectancy-incongruent than congruent 
behaviors. As predicted (Hypothesis 1), we found higher discriminability between the 
behaviors that were presented with and without a trait when those behaviors were 
expectancy-incongruent compared with congruent. We also found fewer false alarms 
for incongruent than congruent behaviors that were presented without a trait 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Although these results support a relative difference in trait encoding between 
expectancy-congruent and incongruent behaviors, they do not verify the encoding 
difficulty fallouts from the expectancy activation. To test this idea, two 
complementary analyses were conducted in which the recognition performance in the 
                                                 
2
 However, this effect was qualified by the type of expectancy, F(3, 16) = 4.98, p < 
.05, MSE = .02, p=.48, which was due to an unexplainable inversion of the expected 
difference when the expectancy was “unfriendly” (M = .06, SD = .07 and M = .17, SD 
= .06, for congruent and incongruent behaviors). 
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expectancy condition (in which an expectancy was activated) was compared with 
recognition performance in the no-expectancy condition (in which there was no 
previous expectancy about the target). This analysis was conducted by item to 
compare recognition accuracy for expectancy-congruent, -incongruent and no 
expectancy versions for the friendly, unfriendly, intelligent, and unintelligent 
behavior descriptions (see Table 2). 
The d’ for each behavior item was the dependent measure in a 4 (nature of 
behavior: friendly vs. unfriendly vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) X 3 (relation to the 
expectancy: congruent vs. incongruent vs. no expectancy) ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last variable. The expected main effect of relation with the 
expectancy was significant (F(2, 88) = 7.66, p < .001, MSE = 1.24, p

=.15) and 
indicated that there were higher d’ scores for incongruent behaviors when an 
expectancy was activated (M = 2.40, SD = .23) compared with the d’ scores that were 
obtained for the same behaviors when there was no expectancy (M = 1.54, SD = .14; 
t(44) = 4.04, p = .001, one-tailed). There was no difference for expectancy-congruent 
behaviors (M = 1.78, SD = .15; t(44) = 1.23, p = .20, one-tailed). There was also a 
main effect for nature of the behavior (F(3, 44) = 6.67, p < .001, MSE = 2.13, 
p

=.31), which suggested an effect from the stimulus material: unfriendly behavior, 
M = 2.76, SD = .24; friendly behavior, M = 1.37, SD = .24; intelligent behavior, M = 
1.50, SD = .24; and unintelligent behavior, M = 1.99, SD = .24. The results from the 
present analysis clearly support that the differences in the trait-encoding of congruent 
and incongruent behaviors depend on activating an expectancy and result in increased 
difficulty encoding expectancy incongruent behaviors by their implied traits (and not 
an increased facility in encoding expectancy-congruent behaviors).  
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An additional analysis was conducted on the proportion of false alarms for the 
behaviors presented without a trait. We conducted a 4 (nature of behaviors: friendly 
vs. unfriendly vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) X 3 (relation to the expectancy: 
congruent vs. incongruent vs. no expectancy) ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
the last variable. The expected main effect for the relation to the expectancy was 
statistically significant, F(2, 88) = 3.27, p < .05, MSE = .02, p

=.07. This effect 
revealed that there was a lower proportion of false alarms for behaviors that were 
incongruent with the previously activated expectancy (M = .12, SD = .03), compared 
with the same behaviors in the no-expectancy condition (M = .19, SD = .02; t(44) = 
2.33, p = .029, one-tailed). There was no difference between the congruent (M = .19, 
SD = .03) and no-expectancy (t(44) = .07, ns, one-tailed) conditions. There was also a 
main effect for nature of behavior (F(3, 44) = 4.71, p < .01, MSE = .07, p

=.24), 
which suggesting an effect from the stimulus material for friendly behaviors, M = .29, 
SD = .04; intelligent behaviors M = .18, SD = .04; unintelligent behaviors M = .14, SD 
= .04; and unfriendly behaviors M = .06, SD = .04. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The false alarm data converges with the d’ analysis results. Expectancies 
increased the difficulty in trait encoding for expectancy-incongruent behaviors, but 
there was no trait encoding facilitation for expectancy-congruent behaviors.  
Discussion 
The results from the present experiment support the hypothesis of higher 
recognition accuracy for expectancy-incongruent compared with congruent behaviors. 
Participants were better at discriminating whether the behavior had been previously 
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presented with or without the implied trait when that behavior was expectancy-
incongruent than when it was congruent (Hypothesis 1). In addition, there were fewer 
false alarms for the incongruent compared with congruent behaviors that were 
presented without a trait (Hypothesis 2). These results indicate greater difficulties 
performing trait encoding of a behavior when that behavior is incongruent compared 
with when it is congruent with expectancies. One possible consequence of this 
processing difference is that expectancy-incongruent information may be better 
represented in episodic memory due to data-driven encoding (Almeida, 2007).  
Importantly, the item analysis results clearly reveal that those differences 
depend on behaviors that are incongruent with the activated expectancy. In fact, we 
found a higher recognition accuracy (higher discriminability and fewer false alarms; 
Hypotheses 3 and 4) when the behavior was incongruent with the provided 
expectancy compared with the same behavior with no activated expectancy. There 
were no facilitation effects for the expectancy-congruent behaviors. 
Overall, these results support the hypothesized difference in trait encoding 
difficulties that result from the expectancy activation. Trait encoding, which occurs by 
default when forming an impression about a person (as illustrated by the absence of 
facilitation effects), becomes obstructed for behaviors that are incongruent with the 
activated expectancy. In contrast, it is easy to make the expectancy-congruent 
behavior encoding for the implied trait.  
Experiment 3 
This experiment directly manipulates the ease at encoding the behavior 
descriptions in terms of traits by including the implied trait in these descriptions, 
either in all of the expectancy-congruent or in all of the incongruent behaviors and it 
explores the consequences of this ease at encoding for memory. 
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As previously suggested by Experiments 1 and 2, the presence of the implied 
trait in expectancy-congruent behaviors should not interfere with information 
processing because those behaviors are already easily encoded by their implied traits. 
Including the implied trait in the incongruent behavioral descriptions could either 
facilitate the trait encoding of those behaviors by increasing their conceptual fluency, 
or, in contrast, contribute to the trait encoding difficulty of those behaviors because 
the incongruency with the expectancy would be more salient.  
However, previous research on impression formation and related fields 
indicates a relation between encoding difficulties and free recall performance. For 
example, attribution inferences (for the cause of a given behavior being either the 
actor of the behavior or the situation) that are difficult to make promote better recall 
for attribution-relevant information, including behavioral information (Hamilton, 
Grubb, Acorn, Trolier, & Carpenter, 1990). Text comprehension research, which 
shares many of the basic inferential processes that are involved in impression 
formation (e.g., Kintsch, 1998; McNamara, Kintsch, Songer, & Kintsch, 1996; 
Peracchi & O’Brien, 2004), has shown that descriptions that are less coherently 
structured and more difficult to encode, result in high-knowledge readers (i.e., readers 
with sufficient background knowledge) engaging in active processing to infer 
relations between concepts that are not explicit. These initial encoding difficulties are 
often functional to learning because they compensate for gaps, or unaccounted 
discrepancies that occur in the available sources of information, and may lead to 
active inferential strategies that enhance both comprehension and retention 
(McNamara et al., 1996). Thus, initial encoding difficulties are sometimes referred to 
as “desirable” difficulties (Bjork, 1994) because they effectively promote better 
learning and memory for the studied information.  
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Similarly, we expect that behaviors that are difficult to understand 
(expectancy-incongruent behaviors) will be better recalled than easy to understand 
(expectancy-congruent) behaviors (the so-called the incongruency effect; Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985). 
Importantly, the present experiment directly manipulates the probability of 
trait encoding of the behaviors by including the implied trait in the behavior 
descriptions, either in the expectancy-congruent or in the incongruent behavior 
descriptions. The third condition presented no traits in any behavioral description 
(trait-absent condition, which corresponded to traditional impression formation 
settings). We predict that the inclusion of implied traits in the behavior descriptions 
that are difficult to encode for traits (i.e., in the expectancy-incongruent behaviors) 
will remove the abovementioned “desirable” trait encoding difficulties, and, 
consequently, eliminate their memory advantage over the easy to encode (expectancy-
congruent) behaviors. In contrast, including the implied traits in the behavior 
descriptions that are easy to encode for traits (i.e., expectancy-congruent behaviors) 
should not make a difference, because these behaviors are already encoded for traits 
by default. Therefore, there should be no effect on the expectancy-incongruent 
advantage in recall.  
An impression judgment task was also included to ensure that the trait 
presentation, specifically the traits that were inconsistent with the expectancy, did not 
interfere with developing the impression. Therefore, we expect no effect of trait 
inclusion in this measure. 
 Method 
Overview. As in the previous experiments, we asked participants to form an 
impression of a target person about whom a previous expectancy was activated. A set 
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of behaviors were described for that target and either all expectancy-congruent or all 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors were presented with the implied trait (trait present 
conditions), or the same behaviors were presented without a trait (trait-absent 
conditions). Then, participants freely recalled the presented behaviors and made a 
final judgment about the target. 
Participants. Participants were 124 undergraduate psychology students from 
the University of Lisbon, who earned them one credit for an introductory psychology 
course for participating in this study. 
Stimulus Material and Constructing the Stimulus Set. For the expectancy 
induction, we presented the target’s occupational group (the same as Experiment 2), 
and used eight personality traits that were stereotypic of each of those groups. The 
behaviors (in the versions with and without the trait) were the same as in Experiment 
2.  
Twelve different set of behaviors were created and varied in trait-dimension 
replication (friendly-unfriendly and intelligent-unintelligent), type of behavior 
presented with the trait (expectancy-congruent, incongruent, or none), and order of 
behavior presentation. Similar to the previous experiments, the occupational group 
ascription was counterbalanced across behavior sets. For the presented behaviors, all 
of the expectancy-congruent behavior descriptions, all of the incongruent behaviors, 
or no behavior descriptions, included the personality trait that was implied by the 
behavior. Finally, two different presentation orders were determined by switching the 
booklet’s two halves. 
Design. The design of this study was a 4 (Type of expectancy: friendly vs. 
unfriendly vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) x 3 (Trait: present in congruent behaviors 
vs. present in incongruent behaviors vs. absent) X 2 (Presentation order: order A vs. 
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order B) x 3 (Behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent vs. irrelevant), with the last 
factor varying within participants. 
Procedure. The initial instructions asked participants to form an impression 
about an individual for whom the occupational group and eight personality traits were 
presented (via audio at a rate of 2 sec per trait). Then, participants received a stimulus 
booklet that contained 36 behaviors that corresponded to their experimental condition, 
either with the trait included in all 12 expectancy-congruent behaviors, in the 12 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors, or with no traits included in any of the behaviors. 
Every 6 sec, they were instructed, via audio, to turn the page and read the next 
behavior. After performing a 5 min filler task that consisted of a pseudo-word letter 
matrix, participants free recalled as many of the presented behaviors as possible for 8 
min. The last task consisted of making impression judgments for the target on three 
different, but related, nine-point rating scales. For the friendly and unfriendly 
expectancy-conditions, the scales were, insensitive-sensitive, unfriendly-friendly, 
unhelpful-helpful; for the intelligent and unintelligent expectancy-conditions the 
scales were fool-wise, unintelligent-intelligent, slow thinker-fast thinker. Although 
there was no time limit for this task, participants were encouraged to make fast and 
intuitive judgments. Finally, we debriefed participants and thanked them for their 
participation. 
Dependent Measures. The dependent measures for this study were the 
number of expectancy-congruent, incongruent, and irrelevant behaviors recalled and 
the mean impression judgment ratings. 
Results 
Free Recall. The behavior descriptions that were recalled by each participant 
were categorized by two coders who were blind to the experimental conditions and 
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used a lenient (“gist”) criterion. The reliability for the coding procedure was high, 
with inter-coder agreement approximately 92%. The intrusions and errors that 
referred to inverting the main meanings of the behaviors (less than 5%) were 
eliminated from the analysis. 
The number of expectancy-congruent, incongruent and irrelevant behaviors 
recalled was the dependent measure in a 4 (type of expectancy) X 3 (trait) X 2 
(presentation order) X 3 (behavior type: congruent vs. incongruent vs. neutral) 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last variable. There was a non-interpretable 
main effect of presentation order (F(1, 100) = 4.59, p < .05, MSE = 3.61), which 
showed higher global recall levels in one of the order manipulations (M = 5.07, SD = 
.14 vs. M = 4.64, SD = .14). There was also a significant main effect for trait, F(2, 
100) = 5.56, p < .01, MSE = 3.61, p

= .10, which revealed that global recall levels 
were higher in the “trait absent” condition (M = 5.27, SD = .17) than in the conditions 
in which the traits were included in congruent behaviors (M = 4.45, SD = .18) or 
incongruent behaviors (M = 4.86, SD = .17). This result is the first indication that 
including traits in behavior descriptions changes the conceptual fluency of those 
behaviors and has a detrimental impact on recall. However, we expected that this 
would happen especially for expectancy-incongruent behaviors. We also found a 
significant main effect for behavior type (F(2, 200) = 37.27, p < .0001, MSE = 2.34, 
p

=.27), which revealed higher recall levels for the expectancy-relevant (M = 5.34, 
SD = .16) compared with irrelevant behavior (M = 3.89, SD = .14) conditions. The 
absence of differences in recalling congruent and incongruent behaviors was not 
surprising: these differences were only expected in two of the three trait-conditions 
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(trait-absent and when the trait was included in congruent behaviors), and not in the 
condition where a trait was included for incongruent behaviors.
3
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The interaction between the behavior type and the trait (see Table 3) was not 
statistically significant, F(4, 200) = 1.43, p = .22, MSE = 2.34, p

=.03. As predicted, 
planned contrasts revealed that the conditions in which the trait was absent and where 
the trait was included in congruent behaviors did not differ, t(100) = .08, p = .47, one-
tailed. Therefore, we combined these conditions. Together, the difference between 
congruent and incongruent behaviors was significant (M = 5.07, SD = .27 vs. M = 
5.55, SD = .28; t(100) = 1.91, p = .03, one-tailed), which illustrated higher recall for 
incongruent than congruent behaviors – the incongruency effect. Moreover, these 
conditions together (i.e., the trait absent condition and the trait in congruent behaviors 
condition) significantly differed from the condition in which a trait was included in 
incongruent behaviors (t(100) = 1.76, p = .04, one-tailed) and the congruent and 
incongruent recall did not significantly differ (M = 5.54, SD = .26 vs. M = 5.28, SD = 
.27; t(100) < 1), which indicated, as expected, that the incongruency effect 
disappeared in this condition.   
In sum, when differences in the trait encoding difficulty for expectancy-
congruent and incongruent behaviors were removed by including a trait in the 
description of incongruent behaviors, these behaviors were not better recalled than 
                                                 
3
 The effect of behavior type was qualified by the type of expectancy (F(6, 200) = 
14.51, p < .0001, MSE = 2.34). This effect may illustrate differences in the 
complexity of the expectancies and is non-interpretable. 
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congruent behaviors
4
. However, it is notable that inspecting the means for the 
condition in which the trait was included in incongruent behaviors raises a possible 
alternative interpretation for the absence of the incongruency effect. Although we 
argue that including the trait decreases recall for expectancy-incongruent behaviors, it 
apparently also enhances recall for expectancy-congruent behaviors when compared 
with the no trait condition.
5
 The absence of the incongruency effect in this condition 
could be interpreted as a consequence of the reversal in expectancies. That is, 
including implied traits for expectancy-incongruent behaviors could undermine the 
initial expectancies and lead to its reversal. This could cause behaviors that were 
originally congruent to become incongruent with the impression, which may lead to a 
decrease in expectancy-incongruent and a boost in expectancy-congruent behavior 
recall. Fortunately, the final impression judgments discriminated between these 
alternatives.  
Impression Judgments. To ensure that including a trait in incongruent 
behaviors did not affect the final impression, an analysis of variance was conducted 
with the mean impression ratings as the dependent variable. Impression judgments 
used three bipolar scales and preliminary analyses evaluated the ratings’ internal 
consistency. These analyses showed a .53 Cronbach’s alpha that was correlated to the 
                                                 
4
 Although the difference between recalled expectancy-congruent and incongruent 
behaviors was not statistically reliable, there was an increase in the number of 
congruent behaviors recalled in the “trait in incongruent” relative to the “trait in 
congruent” condition (M = 5.54, SD = .26 versus M = 4.76, SD = .27, t(100) = 2.09, p 
= .02, one-tailed). Thus, removing trait inference differences probably benefited 
congruent behaviors because they highly corresponded to higher expectancies. 
5
 Because the comparisons we are referring to correspond to between-participant trait 
conditions and there was a between-participants overall recall effect, one might object 
to its informativeness. As such, only differences in the magnitude of the incongruency 
effect would be meaningful. Thus, and in order to make the between conditions 
meaningfully comparable, we used the number of expectancy-irrelevant behaviors as 
a covariate in a new analysis. Although the main effect for the overall recall 
disappeared, the pattern of means remained the same and our critical contrast 
remained significant. 
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first scale (insensitive-sensitive and fool-wise, for friendly-unfriendly and intelligent-
unintelligent domains) but was not strongly correlated with the other scales (< .23). A 
principal components factor analysis suggested a single factor that explained 51.9% 
of the variance, with the two last scales strongly associated with the factor (> .78), but 
the first scale was not strongly associated with that factor (= .55). Thus, data that were 
collected for the first judgment scale were excluded from further analyses. 
Subsequently, we centered both scales on zero, such that a positive difference from 
zero reflected expectancy-congruency biases. The mean (transformed) evaluation 
ratings for the two impression scales (centered on zero) was the dependent measure in 
a 4 (type of expectancy) X 3 (trait) X 2 (presentation order) ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed a non-interpretable main effect for type of expectancy (F(3, 92) = 8.39, p < 
.0001, MSE = 1.52, p

=.21), with impression ratings significantly above zero for all 
expectancies, except for unintelligence (M = -.02, SD = .23). This effect was qualified 
by presentation order (F(3, 92) = 3.24, p < .05, MSE = 1.52, p

=.10), which showed 
that the mean judgments for unintelligence were less than zero in only one 
presentation order (M = -.69, SD = .30 vs. M = .65, SD = .34). Importantly, including 
or not including the trait in the behavioral description had no effect on impression 
judgments, F(2, 92) < 1.  
Discussion 
As predicted, including the implied trait for congruent behaviors did not affect 
behavior processing; rather, it led to the same pattern of results that were found in the 
condition in which no traits were presented, or the recall advantage of expectancy-
incongruent behaviors (i.e., the incongruency effect). However, including the implied 
trait in incongruent behaviors led to equivalent recall levels for expectancy-congruent 
and incongruent behaviors. This result can be explained by removing expectancy-
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incongruent behavior encoding difficulties when the corresponding implied traits 
were explicitly available. As a result, conceptual encoding decreased the need for 
enhanced data-driven encoding strategies that would otherwise be used to overcome 
initial encoding difficulties. Consequentially, better recall for expectancy-incongruent 
relative to congruent behavioral descriptions disappeared. Because the general 
impression was, as predicted, biased towards congruency, even in cases in which a 
trait was available for the encoding of expectancy-incongruent behaviors, indicates 
that presenting those traits did not interfere with developing an expectancy-congruent 
impression about the target.  
General Discussion 
The present work explored the influence of prior expectancies on the ease of 
conceptually encoding behaviors. Specifically, we concentrated on behaviors that 
were incongruent with prior expectancies and clarified the role of conceptual 
encoding ease in impression formation. We argued for extending the encoding 
flexibility model (Sherman et al., 1998) to impression formation, such that conceptual 
encoding, specifically trait encoding, would be easy in expectancy-congruent and 
difficult in expectancy-incongruent trait implicative behaviors, even under conditions 
with no cognitive overload.  
In three studies, we found that activating an initial expectancy about a person 
could obstruct trait encoding for trait-implying behaviors that contradict the gist of the 
expectancy (i.e., the expectancy-incongruent behaviors). In Experiment 1, we showed 
that expectancy-incongruent behaviors conveyed more ambiguous information about 
the personality of the target person. This effect appeared to be associated to (and is 
likely to follow from) the lower conceptual encoding of incongruent behaviors. In 
Experiment 2, a forced-recognition task between two versions of previously presented 
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behaviors that only differed in the explicit inclusion of the implied trait demonstrated, 
as predicted, greater memory performance for expectancy-incongruent behaviors. 
This result provides convergent evidence for the notion that trait encoding of 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors is less probable than for congruent behaviors. 
In Experiment 3, we explored the consequences of the difficulties in trait 
encoding expectancy-incongruent behaviors for the process of impression formation. 
We manipulated the trait encoding difficulty of the behaviors by including (or not) the 
implied traits in the behavioral descriptions. This manipulation had no impact when 
the behavioral descriptions were congruent with initial expectancies. However, 
explicitly including the implied trait removed the episodic memory advantage of 
expectancy-incongruent behaviors (when compared with expectancy-congruent 
behaviors).   
The results from these three experiments show that the conceptual-based (trait 
encoding) vs. data-based asymmetry in processing expectancy-congruent versus 
expectancy-incongruent information as proposed by the encoding flexibility model 
(Sherman et al., 1998), is not limited to conditions of cognitive load, but may drive 
processing in impression formation even under no load. 
Beyond our initial rationale, the present results also have several consequences 
for person memory and person memory models, specifically from Experiment 3.  
The higher recall for expectancy incongruent compared with congruent 
information (i.e., the incongruency effect) has been accounted for as the result of an 
attempt to overcome the challenge to impression cohesion that were derived from 
information that contradicts previous expectancies (Hastie, 1984; Hastie & Kumar, 
1979; Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985). However, in Experiment 3, including the 
implied trait in the expectancy-incongruent behavioral descriptions, rather than 
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making impression formation more challenging and the incongruency effect stronger, 
made the recall difference between expectancy-incongruent and congruent 
information disappear. Although they pose a problem to the person memory model 
(Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981), these results are readily interpretable under the 
present rationale and explain the desirable difficulties that are posed by expectancy-
incongruency information, not for impression cohesion, but for trait encoding 
difficulty. Because including the implied trait in expectancy-incongruent behavioral 
descriptions circumvents encoding difficulties, the incongruency effect was 
undermined. No such effect was expected, nor found, for including the implied trait in 
the expectancy-congruent behavioral descriptions. 
Interestingly, the trait encoding difficulties for expectancy-incongruent 
behaviors might also account for expectancy-based illusory correlations (over-
estimating the number of behaviors that illustrated an expectancy-congruent trait 
versus the number of behaviors that implied a expectancy-incongruent trait; Hamilton 
& Rose, 1980) and, therefore, provide an intuitive explanation for the dissociation of 
the effect of expectancies found between recall and frequency estimation of congruent 
and incongruent behaviors (Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996; Garcia-Marques et 
al., 2002; Garrido, Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 2012) and provide a parsimonious 
alternative account for the TRAP model of the same dissociation (Hamilton & Garcia-
Marques, 2003). That is, difficulties in trait encoding for expectancy-incongruent 
behaviors should become desirable difficulties for recall but lead to relative over-
estimations of the number of expectancy-congruent behaviors. However, additional 
research is needed to test these ideas. 
  Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that several our results are similar to other 
findings in the spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) literature. Wigboldus and 
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colleagues found that stereotypic expectancies inhibit STIs from stereotype-
inconsistent trait-implying behaviors, compared with behaviors that converge with 
these expectancies (Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Wigboldus, 
Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004). Our results extend this STI inhibition 
effect for inferences that occur under impression formation goals. Although there are 
many differences between the processes that underlie intentional impression 
formation and spontaneous trait inferences, the similarities between these results 
suggest that there is an analogous effect of expectancy on trait encoding, which calls 
for examining common components in intentional and spontaneous trait inferences 
(Ferreira et al., 2012). 
Conclusion 
The present research revisited a central question of social psychology – how 
impressions of personality remain stable when confronted with violating evidence. 
We extended the application domain of the flexibility encoding model to impression 
formation by incorporating a new perspective of how to move from behaviors to 
personality traits into impression formation. The proposed extension contributes to 
simultaneously explain two opposite tendencies in the impression formation literature: 
the tendency to better recall behavioral evidence that violates our actual impressions 
about someone, and the tendency to maintain those impressions.   
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Table 1: Mean Recall Levels for each Behavior Type as a Function of the Rating 
Request 
 Behavior Type 
 Congruent Incongruent Irrelevant 
Rating Request M SD M SD M SD 
No Rating 4.88 .25 5.38 .27 5.10 .26 
Rating 4.10 .22 4.41 .24 3.27 .23 
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Table 2: d’ and False Alarms for Congruent and Incongruent Behaviors and No-
Expectancy (base-line) Conditions 
 Expectancy 
 Congruent Incongruent No Expectancy 
Recognition M SD M SD M SD 
d’ 1.78 .15 2.40 .23 1.54 .14 
False Alarms .19 .03 .12 .03 .19 .02 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
INCONGRUENCY AND TRAIT INFERENCE  45 
 
Table 3: Mean Recall Levels for Each Behavior Type as a Function of the Trait 
Condition 
 Behavior Type 
 Congruent Incongruent Irrelevant 
Trait M SD M SD M SD 
In Congruent Behaviors 4.76 .27 5.22 .28 3.36 .25 
In Incongruent Behaviors 5.54 .26 5.28 .27 3.76 .24 
Absent 5.38 .27 5.88 .28 4.55 .24 
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Highlights 
 The role of expectancies on encoding flexibility in impression formation. 
 The trait gist of behavioral information that contradicts previous expectancies is 
hard to extract. 
 Trait encoding difficulties may account for the incongruency and the expectancy-
based illusory correlation effects. 
 Trait encoding difficulties may contribute for impressions’ resistance to change. 
